We take this conception and methodology as premises of our argument. In order to do so, we provide a working conception of systemic oppression and introduce standpoint theory as a way of arguing that members of historically and systemically marginalized groups have more credibility with respect to recognizing and identifying instances of oppression than others who are not members of those groups. This chapter offers a twofold response to the first part of this objection concerning the validity and seriousness of harm caused by linguistic expressions of microaggressions. On the basis of this argument, critics have called for a moratorium on microaggression awareness campaigns and trainings, as well as any further discussion of microaggressions, until there is firm research to confirm that microaggressions are indeed damaging to their recipients and can be empirically measured as such (ibid.).
Furthermore, even if words could result in real harm, we cannot demonstrate this empirically (at least yet) (Lilienfeld 2017). In broad strokes, critics of MRP advance the following argument: microaggressions are often committed via the expressions of words and because words cannot constitute a real form of violence, microaggressions do not and cannot cause genuine, enduring harm (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015, 2018, 204-205 Pinker 2018 Campbell and Manning 2018). Taken together, the objections call into question whether or not self-proclaimed victims of microaggressions are indeed experiencing any real, substantial harm. This chapter aims to respond to a cluster of objections that have been raised against what has been called the "microaggressions research program" (MRP) (see for example Lilienfeld 2017a, 2017b Haidt 2017 Lukianoff and Haidt 2015, 2018).
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